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About this paper symposium
Panel information |
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Panel 20. Social Cognition |
Paper #1 | |
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Minimal Group and Racial/Ethnic Attitudes Among US Minority and Majority Race/Ethnic Children | |
Author information | Role |
Ms. Sarah Michelle Ramsey, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin – Madison, United States | Presenting author |
Brenda Straka, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, United States | Non-presenting author |
Ashley E. Jordan, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin – Madison, United States | Non-presenting author |
Alisha Osornio, Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, Duke University, United States | Non-presenting author |
Mayling Halim, Department of Psychology, California State University, Long Beach, United States | Non-presenting author |
Kristin Pauker, Department of Psychology, University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, United States | Non-presenting author |
Kristina R. Olson, Department of Psychology, Princeton University, United States | Non-presenting author |
Yarrow Dunham, Department of Psychology, Yale University, United States | Non-presenting author |
Sarah E. Gaither, Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, Duke University, United States | Non-presenting author |
Abstract | |
The minimal group effect—in which people prefer ingroup to outgroup members even when group membership is trivially constructed—has been studied extensively in psychological science (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Dunham et al., 2014). Numerous studies have shown that from preschool, children like and preferentially distribute resources to minimal ingroup vs. outgroup members (Sparks et al., 2017). Despite this large body of literature, previous developmental studies lack racially/ethnically diverse populations, and the sample size of typical developmental studies is modest (roughly N = 138). Moreover, it remains unclear whether children’s minimal group attitudes are related to the development of real-world racial/ethnic group preferences. One possibility is that minimal group attitudes predict children’s early racial/ethnic group preferences. Another possibility is that racial/ethnic bias develops independently from children’s abstract ingroup preferences. The present study assesses whether children’s abstract ingroup preferences predict how they make social relationship decisions about racial/ethnic ingroup and outgroup members. Using a collaborative, multi-site study approach, we measure 4–6-year-old children’s [47.1% girls, 40.5% White, 13.3% Black, 12.6% Asian, 24.6% Latine, 9.2% Multiracial] minimal group attitudes and preferences for racial/ethnic ingroups and outgroups in a pre-registered study [N = 716] across five U.S. locations (Honolulu, HI; New Haven, CT; Seattle, WA; Long Beach, CA; Durham, NC). Across two tasks, participants used a six-point face scale to rate their minimal group attitudes and racial/ethnic group preferences, respectively, toward novel peers depicted in static, color images. First, we replicate the minimal group effect in the general sample, t(693) = 5.77, p < .001. Second, when comparing racial/ethnic groups in the omnibus test, we find no significant difference between their minimal group attitudes, F(4,689) = 0.23, p = .921 (Figure 1). Third, we find no relationship between children’s minimal group attitudes and racial/ethnic group preferences F(7, 615) = 0.31, p = .950. Exploratory analyses assessing each racial/ethnic participant group’s separate performance revealed that the minimal group effect was significant among White, t(280) = 4.39, p ≤ .001, Asian, t(87) = 2.57, p = .012, and Latine, t(165) = 1.88, p = .046, but not Black, t(93) = 1.27, p = .209, children. Furthermore, we observed a positive relationship between age and minimal group effect r(684) = 0.11, p = .003 (Figure 2). While the minimal group effect was present overall, when observing racial/ethnic groups individually, we found that the minimal group effect was present in relatively higher-status racial/ethnic groups (i.e., White, Asian), but not a relatively lower-status one (i.e., Black), suggesting that one’s group status impacts the development of the minimal group effect, with higher status groups more heavily weighing abstract group concepts. This underscores the need for more racially/ethnically inclusive samples to elucidate the development of children’s abstract group reasoning and relationship preferences. Finally, children’s minimal group bias did not predict their racial/ethnic ingroup preferences suggesting that ingroup/outgroup thinking alone does not account for young children’s race/ethnic-based preferences. Future work should assess whether factors like the salience of racial/ethnic differences in children’s social environments impact their relationship choices across racial/ethnic groups. |
Paper #2 | |
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How Social Relationships Guide Girls’ Interests in Brilliance-Associated Activities | |
Author information | Role |
Rongzhi Liu, Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, United States | Presenting author |
Vanessa Lazaro, Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, United States | Non-presenting author |
Lin Bian, Department of Psychology, University of Chicago, United States | Non-presenting author |
Abstract | |
Past research has shown that starting from age 6, girls become less interested in activities depicted as requiring brilliance than boys (Bian et al., 2017). In this paper, we explore whether girls’ interests are shaped by their social relationships with others involved in these activities. Specifically, we focus on the extent to which girls feel they belong in these activities. Past studies with adults and adolescents suggest that sense of belonging plays an important role in females’ interests in fields associated with brilliance (Bian et al., 2018; Master et al., 2016). In the current studies, we hypothesize that girls are less interested in activities associated with brilliance because they feel low sense of belonging (Study 1). In addition, observing a group of gender-matched children participating in these activities would increase girls’ sense of belonging as well as their interests (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 61, planned N = 64), we introduced 7- to 8-year-olds to either a competition for children who are “really really smart” (the Smart Competition), or, for comparison, a competition for children who “try really really hard” (the Try-Hard Competition). We found that girls were less interested and felt lower sense of belonging in the Smart Competition than in the Try-Hard Competition, compared to boys (competition x gender interaction for interest: B = -1.01, p = .007; for belonging: B = -1.08, p = .005). Specifically, in the Try-Hard Competition, girls were equally interested as boys (B = 0.38, p = .15) and felt stronger sense of belonging than boys (B = 0.61, p = .024). However, in the Smart Competition, girls were less interested (B = 0.62, p = .017) and felt lower sense of belonging than boys (B = -0.46, p = .085) (Figure 1). Furthermore, we found a gender-moderated mediation effect of condition on interests via belonging (index = 0.72, SE = 0.33, 95% CI = [0.14, 1.45]), such that the Smart Competition undermined girls’ interests by lowering their sense of belonging (ab = -0.36, SE = 0.22, 95% CI = [-0.84, 0.01]), but the Smart Competition increased boy’s interests by promoting their sense of belonging (ab = 0.36, SE = 0.22, 95% CI = [-0.03, 0.82]) (Figure 2). In Study 2 (planned N = 64), we will present 7- to 8-year-olds with a picture of a group of children participating in the Smart Competition, showing either predominantly girls (5 girls and 1 boy) or predominantly boys (5 boys and 1 girl). We predict that after observing a picture with predominantly boys, girls will show lower interests and sense of belonging than boys, as in Study 1. However, after observing a picture with predominantly girls, the gender differences in interests and sense of belonging will disappear. Overall, our findings suggest that girls’ social connections with others in the activities shape their interests in activities associated with brilliance. Our ongoing study will examine a potential intervention strategy to promote girls’ sense of belonging and interests in these activities. |
Paper #3 | |
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The Origins of Social Evaluations of Sleep Arrangements | |
Author information | Role |
Mr. Rodney Tompkins, Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, United States | Presenting author |
Adena Schachner, Department of Psychology, University of California, San Diego, United States | Non-presenting author |
Abstract | |
Sleep is necessary to human wellbeing and survival. Sleep can also be vulnerable, especially when one is sharing a close sleep arrangement with another person (e.g., sleeping in the same tent). In two preregistered experiments, we investigate how young humans reason about other people based on shared sleep arrangements, testing the hypothesis that people derive powerful inferences about social relationships from shared sleep arrangements, and that these expectations emerge even in childhood. First, we asked whether 5–7-year-old children (n = 84) and adults (n = 84) expect sharing a close sleep arrangement to occur more often with kin (‘thick’ social partners; Thomas et al., 2022). Child and adult participants predicted whom they expected a child protagonist to share close sleep arrangements with: kin (sibling; parent) or non-kin (friend; teacher). Within-subject, we compared expectations about sleep-sharing to expectations about two other forms of sharing: sharing of food likely involving saliva-sharing (a known kin-specific expectation; Thomas et al., 2022), and toy-sharing (control trials; Thomas et al., 2022). As predicted, we found that children and adults expected sharing a close sleep arrangement to occur more often between kin than non-kin, and had this expectation more strongly for sleep-sharing than for toy-sharing (children: χ²(2, N = 84) = 32.92, p < .001; adults: χ²(2, N = 84) = 62.07, p < .001; see Fig. 1). Participants also expected saliva-sharing to occur selectively with kin (ps < .001), though expectations about sleep-sharing with kin were equally strong and did not statistically differ (ps > .273). Second, we asked whether 5–7-year-old children (n = 74/84, ongoing) and adults (n = 84) expect an adult who shares a close sleep arrangement with a child to provide that child with a hallmark caregiving behavior: comfort. Again, we compared sleep-sharers to saliva- and toy-sharers. Child and adult participants predicted which of two adults would either comfort a distressed child protagonist (caregiving behavior), or play tag with an excited child protagonist (control trials). Within-subject, participants were asked about all possible pairings of three characters: a previously sleep-sharing, saliva-sharing, or toy-sharing adult. As predicted, adult participants expected sleep-sharers to provide caregiving behavior more than toy-sharers (binomial p < .001), and strikingly, also more than saliva-sharers (binomial p < .001). In contrast, on control trials (‘who would play tag’), adult participants selected toy-sharers over sleep-sharers (binomial p < .001) and saliva-sharers (binomial p < .001). Child preliminary findings showed a trend toward similarly expecting sleep-sharers to provide caregiving behavior over toy-sharers. These experiments provide evidence that by early childhood, humans attend to shared sleep arrangements as socially meaningful, expecting it to occur with kin, and (for adults, and potentially children) using sleep-sharing to predict caregiving behaviors. Future work (e.g. comparing across cultures) may shed light on the extent to which specific early life experiences support children’s rich inferences about the social meaning of sleep. |
Paper #4 | |
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Developing Intuitions that Close Friends Know the Content of Each Other’s Minds | |
Author information | Role |
Brandon Woo, Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, United States | Presenting author |
Emma Yu, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States | Non-presenting author |
Megan Richardson, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States | Non-presenting author |
Ashley J. Thomas, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States | Non-presenting author |
Abstract | |
To maintain and develop close relationships, people often represent the minds of their social partners, including what they want, desire, feel, know, and believe. Here, we investigated whether 6- to 9-year-old children hold the intuition that people in closer relationships better know the content of each other’s minds. We build on two large bodies of research in developmental science. The first concerns children’s intuitive theory of relationships: a system of knowledge that allows them to make sense of social relationships. The second concerns children’s intuitive theory of the mind, a system of knowledge that allows them to make sense of others’ mental states. It remains unknown how these systems interact to support inferences about mental state reasoning within relationships. Experiment 1 (n = 76) focused on emotional attributions within social relationships. We presented 6- to 9-year-old children with videos in which one character turned to and touched a protagonist, and another character instead moved in synchrony with the protagonist. We asked children about the relationships between the characters. We found that children rated the character who had touched the protagonist as being (i) closer to the protagonist and (ii) more likely to know the protagonist’s desires (Figure 1). Children did not, however, think that the character who had touched the protagonist would be more knowledgeable of the protagonist’s exterior features. These findings suggest that children have an intuition that close social partners accurately represent each other’s minds. We reasoned that if children indeed have this intuition, then they should also make the reverse inference: that people who are accurate about each other’s minds are likely to be close social partners. We tested this prediction in Experiment 2 (n = 79). We presented 6- to 9-year-old children with vignettes in which one character was correct about a protagonist’s unobservable emotional state and another character was correct about the protagonist’s observable outfit. For each vignette, we asked children to rate how close each character was to the protagonist. We found that children rated the character who was correct about the protagonist’s emotional state as being closer to the protagonist than the character who was correct about the protagonist’s outfit (Figure 2). In sum, by about 6 years of age, children (i) infer whether people will know about each other’s mental states, based on the relationships that people have with each other, and (ii) infer social closeness, based on the accuracy of people’s mental state attributions. Moreover, children do not make the same inferences concerning observable features of other people; children’s inferences were specific to unobservable mental content. These inferences may support children’s learning about the social world: whether and how people are connected to each other, as well as the strength of those connections. |
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Navigating Social Groups and Relationships: Children’s Developing Sense of Belonging and Social Connection
Submission Type
Paper Symposium
Description
Session Title | Navigating Social Groups and Relationships: Children’s Developing Sense of Belonging and Social Connection |