About this paper symposium

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Panel information
Panel 13. Moral Development

Paper #1
Children from China, Kenya, and the US exchange reasons to resolve disagreements
Author information	Role
Antonia Frederike Langenhoff, Stanford University, United States	Presenting author
Jan Engelmann, University of California, Berkeley, United States	Non-presenting author
Abstract
Whether on social media, in town hall meetings, or over dinner with friends, the exchange of reasons in rational discourse is a powerful way to resolve disagreements and to reduce polarization. Yet, very little is known about the developmental origins of this capacity. In addition, the little research that does exist has been carried out exclusively with children from Western cultural contexts (see Köymen & Tomasello, 2020), and little is known about reason-giving in children from other cultural backgrounds. Addressing this gap is important from a methodological perspective, as it allows us to reduce the persistent sampling bias in (Developmental) Psychology (Nielsen et al., 2017). It is also crucial from a theoretical perspective, as studying reason-giving across cultures speaks to a long-standing debate about whether reason-giving is a universal, early-developing part of human nature (Mercier & Sperber, 2011) or a predominantly Western way of resolving conflicts of interest (e.g., Nisbett et al., 2001). In the first cross-cultural study on reason-giving to date, we investigated the development of this capacity in 180 dyads of 5- to 9-year-old children from China, Kenya, and the US. Children were first separately exposed to either perceptual or testimonial evidence regarding the location of a reward and then, they participated in a decision-making task in which they had to jointly choose one of two possible options to acquire the reward. In the first condition, children’s individually acquired evidence pointed toward the same reward location, while in the second, key condition, children’s individually acquired evidence supported opposing locations. Detailed analyses of deliberative interactions during joint decision-making revealed that children selectively and consistently provided reasons in light of conflicting evidence (p<.001; see Figure 1). Even children of the youngest age group gave reasons to build consensus. Importantly, the development and flexibility of children’s reason-giving showed almost identical patterns in China, Kenya, and the US. These findings suggest that, from a young age, children across diverse societies possess key capacities for engaging in rational public discourse and resolving disagreements by using reasons rather than force.

Paper #2
In disagreements about group-based beliefs, children and adults think people should follow the evidence
Author information	Role
Dr. Joshua Rottman, Ph.D., Franklin & Marshall College, United States	Presenting author
Abstract
People are motivated both to have accurate beliefs and to uphold partisan beliefs, and these motivations sometimes conflict. When different groups diverge in their stances on a particular issue, how do people evaluate individuals who strive to form an accurate belief about the issue (thus reducing moral disagreement) rather than remaining loyal to their group's belief (thus perpetuating moral disagreement)? In a preregistered study, we investigated whether 6- to 9-year-old children (n = 98) and adults (n = 62) from the United States evaluate information-seeking and belief change––two key components of intellectual humility––as condemnable or commendable in novel intergroup situations, when adopting a new belief would reflect a departure from the factual or moral beliefs held by ingroup members. Specifically, we presented participants with scenarios in which a protagonist discovered that a belief they had long held was opposed by a separate belief in another country, after which this protagonist then attended a lecture in a neutral country and heard expert evidence favoring the outgroup’s belief. We manipulated whether the groups were in conflict and whether the beliefs were factual or moral, though neither of these factors exerted a reliable effect. Across conditions, 84% of children and 89% of adults said that it was praiseworthy to seek out information about outgroups’ divergent factual and moral beliefs. Additionally, 63% of children and 84% of adults judged that it was praiseworthy for others to change their beliefs to match an outgroup’s beliefs when faced with compelling evidence. However, while 80% of adults thought it would be bad to retain existing beliefs in the face of conflicting evidence, only 39% of children judged belief stasis to be bad, suggesting a major developmental shift in evaluations of belief fixedness. Finally, 83% of adults and 62% of children judged that, upon discovering evidence supportive of an outgroup’s belief, people should tell their fellow ingroup members that the outgroup’s belief is correct. We did not detect any age-related changes between 6 and 9 years of age. Thus, this study indicated that children and adults generally consider information-seeking and belief revision to be praiseworthy tendencies, even when these dispositions mean that people will adopt beliefs that conflict with the dominant beliefs held by their ingroup. In two follow-up studies with adults from the United States (n = 440 and n = 472), we additionally examined these tendencies in the context of contested political beliefs (e.g., defunding the police; restricting immigration) and found largely convergent results. Overall, our data indicate that children and adults praise the pursuit of accuracy in third-party intergroup contexts. This suggests that, across development, people believe that a convergence of beliefs should be possible even for contested partisan issues, and that it is unreasonable to disagree about moral issues on the basis of group membership.

Paper #3
Perceptions of Moral Reasonableness Among Emerging Adults: Sources and Consequences
Author information	Role
Arvid Samuelson, Cornell University, United States	Presenting author
Audun Dahl, Cornell University, United States	Non-presenting author
Abstract
American youth grow up in a society rife with moral disagreement. The consequences of our moral disagreements depend, in part, on whether we see those who disagree with us as reasonable (Finkel et al., 2020; McMahon, 2009; Pew, 2020): Do we think that a well-intentioned, rational person could conclude differently on abortion, immigration, or gun rights? If so, we may respect them more; if not, we may fear, shun, or even attack them. Perceptions of reasonableness develop by early adulthood, as youth face a social reality of growing complexity (Eckstein, 2012; Dahl & Killen, 2021). Some prior work has examined the development of intellectual humility (Sternberg & Jordan, 2005). But whereas intellectual humility is a characteristic of individuals, perceptions of moral reasonableness arise when one person learns about the moral view of another person about a specific issue. Perceptions of moral reasonableness, and their consequences for how young people treat each other, will vary from one situation to the next. Here, we investigate the sources and consequences of perceptions of moral reasonableness among emerging adults. We hypothesized that people would view moral disagreements as more reasonable when the issues were (H1) more complex (i.e., had more competing considerations) and (H2) less familiar (i.e., lacking direct experience). Study 1 investigated the effects of these planned manipulations with hypothetical moral dilemmas. A sample of emerging adults (N = 100, Mage = 19.6) saw vignettes where an agent had to choose between two options (e.g., whether to keep or return a found wallet). Stories varied in their complexity (low vs. high) and familiarity (low vs. high). After participants made their own moral judgment, they were asked a series of questions about a hypothetical person who made the opposing moral judgment. Study 2 examined perceptions of whether politico-moral disagreements were reasonable. In addition, we tested the hypothesis (H3) that people would be less eager to socialize with people they perceived as less reasonable. Emerging adults (N = 57, Mage = 20.4) read vignettes about the political beliefs of hypothetical individuals. Half of the vignettes described a conservative view and half described a liberal view on controversial political issues (abortion, gun control, immigration, capital punishment, and healthcare). Analyses focused on beliefs that participants disagreed with. Both Studies provided support for H1 and H2, measuring higher reasonableness ratings for disagreement about issues that were more complex, ps < .001, and less familiar, ps < .001. Study 2 also provided support for H3; participants were more willing to befriend, ps < .001, and were less hostile toward, ps < .001, people they perceived as more morally reasonable. We will also present data from an ongoing Study 3 with adolescents. These findings show that people can perceive opposing moral views as reasonable, especially when they think the issues are complex and unfamiliar. Study 2 also found that these perceptions predict sociability toward those you disagree with. Understanding the development of moral reasonableness perceptions is a key challenge for a polarized democracy that seeks to nurture respectful disagreements about issues of right and wrong.

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