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About this paper symposium
| Panel information |
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| Panel 4. Cognitive Processes |
| Paper #1 | |
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| Consistency Monitoring and Domain-Specific Learning | |
| Author information | Role |
| Igor Bascandziev, Ed.D., Harvard University, United States | Presenting author |
| Adani Abutto, Stanford University, United States | Non-presenting author |
| Caren Walker, University of California, San Diego, United States | Non-presenting author |
| Elizabeth Bonawitz, Harvard University, United States | Non-presenting author |
| Abstract | |
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Young children’s naïve understanding of the world is often inaccurate and permeated with misconceptions and inconsistencies. For example, 6- and 7-years-old children believe that weight is an accidental property of matter (akin to odor) (Smith, 2007). On this view, some things weigh something, and some things weigh nothing at all. At the same time, however, the same 6- and 7-years-old children believe that a pile of rice weighs something and they also believe that the sum of an infinite number of zeros equals zero (Bascandziev & Carey, 2022). Thus, the collection of beliefs that a grain of rice weighs nothing at all (i.e., 0 grams), that a pile of rice weighs something, and that the sum of an infinite number of zeros equals zero are inconsistent with each other. Importantly, young children do not easily notice such inconsistencies at an explicit level (i.e., available to verbal report), and they do not easily revise beliefs in order to achieve consistency (Limón & Carretero, 1997). The existence of such inconsistent beliefs raises the question of how important the general ability to explicitly notice inconsistencies is for the process of theory revision and theory construction. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that children’s domain-general ability to explicitly notice inconsistencies among statements is associated with their domain-specific progress towards generating more accurate model of reality. We tested this hypothesis in the context of children’s developing theory about the physical world (Carey, 2009). We tested 100 children (MAge = 84.79 months; SD = 12.21; range = 57 to 114 months). The sample was drawn from a predominantly white, Non-Hispanic, middle-class population. All children received a Physics Interview, a battery of Executive Functioning measures, a Cognitive Reflection - Developmental measure (Shtulman & Young, 2022), and a Consistency Monitoring measure. The Consistency Monitoring measure was developed by adapting the pioneering work of Markman (1977) where children are being read stories that contain inconsistencies, and are then asked if the story made sense, if it is true, and if there was something confusing about the story. We found that Consistency Monitoring is associated with Physics Understanding, even when controlling for Age, Executive Functioning, and Cognitive Reflection. Table 1 presents hierarchical regression models, including the fully controlled Model F. Model F shows that controlling for Age, Executive Function, and Cognitive Reflection, the predicted score of Physics Understanding is .21 higher for 1-unit difference on Consistency Monitoring. This finding highlights the importance of explicit consistency monitoring skills in the accumulation and expression of domain-specific understanding, and it suggests future avenues for development and research of educational interventions that take into account the role of consistency monitoring skills in science learning. |
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| Paper #2 | |||
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| "Because they don't exist" Children’s misconceptions about the existence of scientific and supernatural entities | |||
| Author information | Role | ||
| Allison J. Williams-Gant, Ph.D., Boston University, United States | Presenting author | ||
| Lauren Cunningham, Boston University, United States | Non-presenting author | ||
| Kathleen H. Corriveau, Boston University, United States | Non-presenting author | ||
| Abstract | |||
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By 4-years-old children can make accurate ontological distinctions between the existence of unobservable scientific and supernatural entities (i.e., God, germs; Harris et al., 2006). Additional research including low consensus items have found significant variability in adults’ beliefs in the existence of scientific entities (e.g., aliens; Clegg et al., 2019) or supernatural entities (e.g., karma; Kapitány et al., 2020). Research with adults has found increased analytic processing decreases the likelihood of belief in the existence of supernatural entities (Pennycook et al., 2012), however it is unclear whether this same pattern is true with children. This study aims to examine relations between children’s cognitive reflection, their judgments about the existence of unobservable supernatural and scientific entities, and children’s justifications for their misconceptions (i.e., judging scientific entities as pretend and supernatural entities as real). Participants included 90 5- to 10-year-olds (Mage=7.96, SD=1.75; 37 females). First, children completed the CRT-D (Young & Shtulman, 2020). Then, children were randomly presented with two scientific (i.e., black holes and aliens) and two supernatural (i.e., ghosts and unicorns) entities. For each entity, participants were asked “Have you ever heard of [entity]?” If they were familiar, children were invited to consider the reality status of the entity (“Are [entity] real or not real?”), and to justify their response (“How do you know [entity] are real/not real?”). Open-ended responses were transcribed and coded by 2 independent coders (93.41% agreement, cohen’s kappa = 0.85; see Table 1). The coding scheme was adapted from Harris et al. (2005). We first examined the effects of CRD-T score and Age on children’s reality status of each Entity type. A generalized mixed effects model revealed significant effects of Age (p=.004) and Entity Type (ps<.001; see Figure 1). CRT-D and all interactions were not significant, ps>.080. Post-hoc test comparisons for Entity type found significant differences in children’s reality status judgments for Black holes and all other variables (ps<.001) and no differences between the other three entities (ps>.153). To explore children’s scientific misconceptions, we focused on children’s ontological judgments for low consensus entities. Children were most likely to have a misconception about the existence of Aliens such that 59/82 children believed Aliens were not real, as compared to only 7/71 children who believed Black holes were not real. When judging supernatural entities, 17/82 children believed Ghosts were real and 13/84 children believed Unicorns were real. When justifying these misconceptions, children were equally likely to produce all types of open-ended justifications: Encounter (31%), Source (30%), Generalization/Elaboration (35%), I don't know/Uninformative (30%). Our research suggests that children do not make a sharp distinction between supernatural and scientific low-consensus entities. Cognitive reflection did not serve as a significant predictor of these judgments, nor were they related to specific justification types; future research should explore additional mechanisms associated with children’s ontological judgments. We discuss implications for children’s challenges with making such domain-specific distinctions. |
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| Paper #3 | |||
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| Parent’s Observed and Reported Approaches to Children’s Science Misconceptions | |||
| Author information | Role | ||
| Sam R. McHugh, Ph.D., Brown University, United States | Presenting author | ||
| Maureen A. Callanan, University of California, Santa Cruz, United States | Non-presenting author | ||
| Abstract | |||
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Previous research has documented that children have many alternative frameworks (otherwise known as misconceptions) about science and nature (Shtulman & Walker, 2020), and that parents are aware of these misconceptions (Nguyen & Rosengren, 2004). For example, some young children think of the sun’s movements as rising and falling in the same place, or that coating themselves with soap can prevent them from being sick. While some might view these incorrect ideas as a problem to correct (Shtulman, 2017), these misconceptions could be seen as a first step towards understanding astronomy and germ theory (Hammer, 1996). The central aim of this research is to investigate how parents navigate conversations about science misconceptions with their children. Although both of the previous examples are considered misconceptions about science, it was hypothesized that parents may correct misconceptions that relate to their child’s health and safety more than to general science topics like the planets, plants or animals. Children between the ages of 4- to 6-years-old and their parents (N=107) participated in this study (55 girls, 52 boys, M=63.09 months, SD=10.41 months, Range: 48-83 months; 69 mothers, 38 fathers). First, dyads completed a prompted conversation activity where they were invited to talk about 10 different science and nature topics; five “high-stakes” topics about health and safety, five “low-stakes” topics about general science misconceptions. Then, parents participated in a brief interview where they were asked about how they respond to their children’s science misconceptions followed by a failure mindset (Haimovitz & Dweck, 2016) and attitudes towards science (Szechter & Carey, 2009) questionnaire. In the prompted conversation activity, parents were observed approaching misconceptions by (a) providing the correct answer (M=3.37 topics), (b) scaffolding (M=1.86), (c) mixed (scaffolding/correct answer) (M=3.51), or (d) exploring (M=0.25) for the 10 different topics. A 2 (Stakes: High vs. Low) x 4 (Approach: Providing the Correct Answer, Scaffolding, Mixed, Exploring) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to explore the patterns in how parents responded to the high-stakes and low-stakes topics in conversations with their children. As predicted, we found a significant Stakes x Approach interaction, F(2.19, 177.64)=5.03, p= 006, η²p=0.06 (see Figure 1). Parents provided the correct answer for high-stakes topics significantly more frequently than low-stakes topics, p=.007. Parents were observed taking an exploring approach more frequently for low-stakes topics than high-stakes topics, p=.049. In the interview, parents reported they respond to misconceptions by (a) correcting (44%), (b) scaffolding (23%) and (c) exploring (8%) their children’s science misconceptions. Multinomial logistic regressions revealed that more positive views of failure predicted a greater likelihood of parents reporting a scaffolding compared to a correcting or exploring approach, χ2(10, N=81)=22.09, Nagelkerke R2=0.283, p=.015 (see Table 1). Altogether the present study illuminates how parents and children engage with misconceptions. Children have opportunities to make sense of the natural and physical world and develop their scientific understanding by engaging in everyday conversations and activities with their parents. This scientific understanding becomes a crucial lifelong skill as there is an ever-increasing need to critically evaluate evidence. |
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Making Sense of Misconceptions: Exploring the Mechanisms and Social Context of Children's Science Misconceptions
Submission Type
Paper Symposium
Description
| Session Title | Making Sense of Misconceptions: Exploring the Mechanisms and Social Context of Children's Science Misconceptions |