About this paper symposium

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Panel information
Panel 20. Social Cognition

Paper #1
What should change? How children think groups should redistribute power
Author information	Role
Mack Briscoe, Harvard University, United States	Presenting author
Ashley Thomas, Harvard University, United States	Non-presenting author
Abstract
Groups often navigate situations with limited resources. Frequently, those with greater control of those resources divide them in their own favor. How do children think about addressing power imbalances between groups? To investigate this, we showed 6-8 year old children short stories about two different groups of people living on an island, sharing a limited number of resources. Children were informed that one of these groups was in charge. They saw two conditions: one in which the group in charge distributed resources unequally in their own favor, and another in which the group in charge distributed resources equally between groups. At test, we asked children how they thought the people on the island should make decisions in the future: should the same group, the other group, or both groups be in charge? We found that children show an initial preference to have both groups be in charge, regardless of whether the incumbent distributed resources equally or unequally (76%; CI = [0.6471, 0.8824], chance = 50%). However, when children gained additional experience with the groups and saw examples from each condition, they preferred to have only one group in charge rather than both (71%; CI = [0.5882, 0.8235 ], chance = 50%) (Figure 1). Which group they preferred was also sensitive to how the incumbent distributed resources previously. If they did so unequally, children reported that the other group should be in charge (64%; CI = [0.44, 0.84], chance = 33.33%). On the other hand, if the incumbent distributed resources equally, children tended to prefer to have that same group remain in charge, though this effect was not significant (50%; CI = [0.3077, 0.6923], chance = 33.33%) (Figure 2). These data suggest that children have dynamic dispositions about how to deal with power imbalances between groups. They consider not only who is currently in charge and how fairly they’ve acted while in power, but also how others who have been in charge in the past have acted. Future studies will investigate the underlying reasons why children switch from preferring to have both groups in power to only one. Do children update their priors on how fair others will act when in charge? Do they seek to reward those who share equally by letting them remain in power, and punish those who don’t? Answering these questions can provide us insight on which variables children consider important when figuring out how to change their social environments.

Paper #2
Reasoning about Merit-Based and Egalitarian Compensation Systems: Implications for Group Dynamics
Author information	Role
Shuai Shao, UCSD, United States	Presenting author
Gail Heyman, UCSD, United States	Non-presenting author
Abstract
Tensions between merit-based and egalitarian forms of resource allocation underlie some of the most consequential socio-political debates in modern history (Starmans et al., 2017). When considering resource allocation, people often take various values into account, with two of the most important being egalitarianism (Shaw & Olson, 2012) and meritocracy (Baumard et al., 2012). Prior research has made good progress in understanding how these values play out when individuals make decisions. However, the way these values are implemented can also have broader implications for social dynamics. For example, merit-based systems can lead to social comparisons and create win-lose situations where benefits for some come at the cost of others within a group (Gabris & Mitchell, 1988). The present research takes a developmental perspective to examine reasoning about the broader intragroup implications of incentive systems that prioritize different values. Participants included 7- to 10-year-olds (with limited labor market experience), 15- to 18-year-olds (transitioning into the labor market), and adults over 30 (with substantial work experience) in the United States (total N = 124). All participants read the same story about two cupcake-selling clubs. In the “Same Pay for All” club (operating under an egalitarian system), all child protagonists were paid equally, regardless of individual performance. In the “More Pay for More Sales” club (operating under a merit-based system), all child protagonists were paid based on how many cupcakes they sold. Participants rated two statements for each club on a 7-point Likert scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), respectively: (1) “Children in this club will help each other as much as they can” (help question) and (2) “Children in this club will have trouble getting along with each other” (conflict question). Results showed that, in terms of help, participants inferred that people in the merit-based organization (M = 3.66, SD = 1.74) would be less likely to help others than those in the egalitarian organization (M = 4.85, SD = 1.46), B = 1.16, SE = 0.18, 95% CI [0.79, 1.52], p < .001. The interaction between compensation system and age group was also significant (p < .001): the effect was driven by adult participants (B = 2.32, SE = 0.31, 95% CI [1.43, 3.21], p < .001), but not child (B = 0.50, SE = 0.32, 95% CI [-0.43, 1.43], p = .630) and adolescent participants (B = 0.65, SE = 0.32, 95% CI [-0.28, 1.58], p = .337). In terms of conflict, participants inferred people in the merit-based organization (M = 4.19, SD = 1.51) would have more interpersonal conflict than people in the egalitarian organization (M = 3.00, SD = 1.26), B = 1.18, SE = 0.17, 95% CI [0.84, 1.51], p < .001, though the difference did not reach significant level among adolescents (see Figure 1). In summary, we found a developmental change indicating that, as individuals aged, they were more likely to infer that egalitarian systems could promote group harmony, while merit-based systems could induce intragroup conflict.

Paper #3
Who Should Have a Voice?: Children’s Evaluations of Universalist Versus Exclusive Group Decision-making
Author information	Role
Hannah Hok Kim, MIT, United States	Presenting author
Gabriella Silva, UChicago, United States	Non-presenting author
Alex Shaw, UChicago, United States	Non-presenting author
Fan Yang, UChicago, United States	Non-presenting author
Abstract
In a just society, who should have a voice in group decision making? One central debate revolves around the trade-offs between “universal” practices, emphasizing inclusivity and maximal participation, and “exclusive” practices that limit participation to yield better decision-making (Teorell, 2006). Across two studies we probe the foundational intuitions underlying these important questions through a developmental lens, examining 4-9-year-old children’s evaluations of universalist versus exclusive decision-making systems. Study 1 (N = 107) examined 4- to 9-year-old children’s perceptions about universal vs. expert-led exclusive decision-making. We told children about two fictional systems, one with a universalist decision-procedure (where everyone decides) and one with an exclusive decision-procedure (where only the experts decide). We asked children to evaluate which system was better, more fair, faster, and which they would rather live in. Compared to the expert-led system, most children across ages evaluated the universalist system as better (M = 70%, p < .001) and more fair (M = 80%, p < .001), as well as indicated they would rather live in the universalist system (M = 73%, p < .001), Figure 1. Nevertheless, children were more likely to recognize the exclusive system as faster (M = 65%, p = .003), an effect that strengthened with age (p = .013). Study 2 (N = 120) further investigated if children distinguished different exclusive systems. Children were told a similar story as in Study 1, but that some people in different systems were excluded for different reasons: incompetence, immoral behaviors, or arbitrary characteristics. First, we asked children to evaluate how fair (1-4 scale) exclusion was based on these three different reasons. We found that children were significantly more likely to think that excluding based off immorality (M = 2.83, SD = 1.17) was fairer than excluding based off incompetence (M = 2.17, SD = 1.09), followed by excluding based off of arbitrary cues (M = 1.51, SD = .93), ps < .01, Figure 2. We also gave children a forced choice measure of which system was more fair and fast between each exclusive system and the universalist system. We found that children believed universalist systems were fairer than exclusions for incompetence or arbitrary reasons (ps < .001). Children did not select differently than chance on exclusive systems that were excluded for immorality. Conceptually replicating Study 1, with age children increasingly recognized that exclusive decision systems were faster than universal decision systems, demonstrating an understanding of the trade-offs between decision inclusiveness and efficiency. An ongoing study explores whether children's preference for universalist systems extends to decision-making on significant issues that heavily impact people's interests (pilot data suggests they may be more tolerant of exclusive voting on such decisions). Together, these findings reveal that long before children engage in formal political activities, they already possess beliefs about universalist versus exclusive decision systems and the trade-offs associated with them. The findings contribute to a better understanding of the building blocks that underlie significant group decision-making systems in modern society.

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